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CASENOTE: THE EMERALD
CASINO FIASCO
CORY ARONOVITZ"
JON TOPOLEWSKI*"

A recent decision in the United States Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals restricts the ability of a bankruptcy court to exercise
post confirmation authority over a state administrative
proceeding. In the consolidated appeals of Village of Rosemont v.
Aaron Jaffe and Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board,'
the Seventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court was unable to

compel the Illinois Gaming Board (hereinafter the "IGB") to carry
through with a plan to transfer a casino license from Emerald
Casino to the Isle of Capri Casino.2 The following casenote will
first attempt to unravel and clarify the factual underpinnings of
this decision. This note will then analyze the manner in which the
. Mr. Aronovitz has fifteen years of gaming law experience as a
regulator/former legal counsel to the Illinois Gaming Board and in private
practice representing some of the largest manufacturers, suppliers and
operators in legalized gaming jurisdictions. Mr. Aronovitz is the Founder of
The Casino Law Group LLC, an adjunct professor of gaming law at the John
Marshall Law School, and a founding member of the International Masters of
Gaming Law.
In 1994, Cory was the award recipient of The John Rosecrance
Gambling Research Paper Competition, by The Institute for the Study of
Gambling and Commercial Gaming, University of Nevada. In August 2000,
Cory was named one of the "Top 40 Lawyers Under 40" by the Chicago Law
Bulletin. And, in May 2005, Cory was presented with a Distinguished Service
Award from The John Marshall Law School for his achievements in gaming
law.
Mr. Aronovitz has published extensively and is a frequent speaker
related to various gaming issues.
.. Mr. Topolewski is in his third year at the Loyola University Chicago
School of Law. While at Loyola, he has been active in the school's moot court
program. For the past two years he has represented Loyola in the highly
competitive Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition, acting as
captain of the team this year. Mr. Topolewski recently contributed to an
update of the United States Case Law section for the 10th edition of the
Internet Gambling Report © 2007 Clarion Gaming. Prior to attending Loyola
Law, Mr. Topolewski graduated from DePaul University with a B.S. in
Economics.
1. 482 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Emerald II1].
2. Id. at 928-29, 931.
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Seventh Circuit dealt with the claims of the appellants, the Village
of Rosemont and Emerald Casino.
I.

FACTS

An undergrowth of tangled and sordid facts led to the Seventh
Circuit's decision. Appellant Emerald Casino, Inc. operated a
riverboat gaming facility in East Dubuque, Illinois, until it closed
the casino in 1997. That same year, Emerald applied for a license
renewal but sought to relocate the casino to Rosemont, Illinois.4 In
support of the relocation, appellant Village of Rosemont
constructed a casino parking facility.5
To the surprise and
disappointment of both parties, the IGB denied Emerald's request
for renewal, and Emerald sought administrative review of the
denial.6 The administrative law judge, after conducting a de novo
hearing, issued a recommendation based on findings of fact and
conclusions of law consistent with the IGB's Notice of Denial. The
IGB then issued its Final Board Order denying Emerald renewal
of its Owner's License.
Following the Final Board Order, the Illinois General
Assembly entered the picture and amended the Illinois Riverboat
Gambling Act (hereinafter the "IRGA"). 7
Basically, the
amendment stated that if an applicant correctly completed the
application and the municipality agreed to the receipt of the
license, the IGB shall grant the renewal.8 In 1999, Emerald was
permitted to reapply' for a renewal and Rosemont consented to the
relocation plan, but the IGB again denied the request.' °
Additionally, the IGB brought a five-count disciplinary action
against Emerald in which the IGB sought to revoke Emerald's
existing license."
Emerald, meanwhile, sought a writ of
mandamus directing the IGB to approve its application."
In
Emerald I, the appellate court held that the language of the
3. Id. at 929.
4. Id.
5. Id; see also Greg Hinz, Time to Cash In; Legal War over Emerald Casino
Needlessly Costing Taxpayers Millions, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Nov. 28, 2005, at 2

(noting that Rosemont spent forty-five million dollars on the construction of
the parking garage built in anticipation of the relocation of Emerald Casino).
6. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 929.
7. Id.; 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/11.2(a) (2004).
8. 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/11.2(a).

9. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 929. In light of the new amendment to the
IRGA, the Board declared the administrative judge's prior order affirming the
denial of Emerald's license moot and allowed Emerald to file a new application
for renewal and relocation. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 803 N.E.2d 914 (Ill. App. Ct.

2003) [hereinafter EmeraldI].
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amendment was non-discretionary - if the application was
complete and there was municipality approval, then the IGB must
approve the renewal.'
Concurrent with the decision of the appellate court in
Emerald I, the IGB continued its administrative disciplinary
proceeding and sought to revoke Emerald's gaming license. 15 The
Village of Rosemont and four creditors, after discovering the
detrimental nature of the proposed settlement between Emerald
and the IGB, brought an involuntary bankruptcy action against
Emerald. This bankruptcy action was later converted into a
Chapter Eleven proceeding. 6
Emerald then fought a two-front battle against two
countervailing forces: the IGB's obvious distaste for Emerald's
gaming practices and the Village of Rosemont's desire to have it
follow through with its plan to relocate a casino to Rosemont. The
only option that seemed to appease both sides was to transfer the
license to a third party. 7 In May 2003, such a plan was filed with
Subsequently, the Attorney General
the bankruptcy court. 8
(hereinafter "AG") entered the picture. 9 The AG stated that she
would not approve a plan that resulted in any sort of net gain for
Emerald's shareholders. ° Under the belief that AG approval was
required to settle the case, the IGB concluded that it had to
recommence the disciplinary proceedings against Emerald.'
Emerald's troublesome two-front battle became an almost
insurmountable four-front attack. Emerald fought against the
Village of Rosemont and its creditors who sought a casino; against
the IGB who sought a transfer of Emerald's license; against the
AG who sought an uneconomical dissolution of Emerald; and
against Emerald's own shareholders who sought some return on
their investment.
On December 15, 2003, the IGB, Emerald Casino, and the AG
signed what was referred to as the "First Side Letter."22
Essentially, this letter provided certain necessary criteria for the

14. Id. at 925-28.
15. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 930.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Attorney General's Fight for Integrity of Illinois Gaming Upheld by
Federal Appeals Court, U.S. STATE NEWS, Apr. 4, 2007 (discussing Lisa

Madigan's commitment to ensuring that Illinois casinos are run by ethical
parties).
20. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 930. The AG's refusal was based on the theory
that Emerald's shareholders were not entitled to a return on their investment
when Emerald had been accused of wrongdoing in the administrative
proceedings. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 930-31.
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transfer of Emerald's license.'
The letter also included two
clauses that became paramount to the Seventh Circuit's decision.
First, the letter stated that at any point either the IGB or the AG
could revoke its commitment to the plan.24 Second, the letter
reaffirmed the State's sovereign immunity."
Soon thereafter, a winning bidder for the license was found in
the Isle of Capri Casino. The AG, however, disputed the transfer,
arguing that the transfer violated multiple provisions of the side
letter.2 7
Even without the AG's approval, the IGB and Emerald
presented the plan to the bankruptcy court.2 One particular
portion of the bankruptcy proceeding transcript, wherein the judge
questioned the strength of the plan, became important to the
Seventh Circuit's ultimate decision.2
Specifically, the judge
questioned the ability of the plan to withstand revocation. The
parties, either failing to recognize this potential or anticipating
that they could enjoin the IGB or the AG from revoking the license
in the bankruptcy court, agreed to proceed. The bankruptcy judge
confirmed the plan on May 17, 2004."'

23. Id.
24. Id. at 931.
25. Id.
26. Id. Isle of Capri, a publicly-traded company that operated fifteen
gaming facilities at the time of the bid, was willing to pay five hundred and
eighteen million dollars for the license. Id.
27. Id. The AG disputed that the bidding process was unnecessarily
skewed to the benefit of the VillageVillage of Rosemont. Id. The AG criticized
the decision to favor the VillageVillage of Rosemont merely because of the
parking garage the VillageVillage built, which the AG labeled as
"unauthorized conduct." Id. The AG also questioned the disciplinary history
of the transferee, the Isle of Capri Casino, and noted that it had been fined by
both state and federal regulators. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see id. at 936 ("The bankruptcy judge's warning could not have been
any plainer: he alerted the parties to the fact that the membership of the
Board might change, and that the license might be revoked, and they all said
they were willing to go forward with this plan anyway.").
30. Id. The conversation before the bankruptcy judge went as follows:
The Court: Is there anything that would prevent the resumption of the
revocation proceeding and the revocation of the license here, despite
confirmation of the plan that's presently before the Court, other than a
majority vote of the Illinois Gaming Board?
[Emerald's Counsel]: No.
The Court: So that if the membership of the gaming board changed, or if
members of the gaming board changed their mind, there would still be a
potential revocation?
[Emerald's Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, there's all sorts of things that
could happen.
Id. at 931-32.
31. Id. at 932. The bankruptcy court made clear, however, that the plan
was not binding on the AG who was not a party before the court. Id.
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At that point, Emerald successfully managed to gain the
allegiance of both the Village of Rosemont and the IGB. In doing
so, however, the Village of Rosemont and the IGB gained an
adversary in the AG. Following the confirmation of the plan, the
AG attempted to prevent the IGB from performing a suitability
review of the Isle of Capri Casino." The IGB reacted by passing
what the court referred to as the "Second Side Letter," which
revoked the portions of the "First Side Letter" that the AG
previously alleged were breached by the transfer to Isle of Capri.33
The bickering between the IGB and the AG soon took an
unfortunate turn for Emerald when in March 2005, two new
Following the new
members were appointed to the IGB.34
appointments, the IGB elected to continue with the disciplinary
proceeding, as the IGB had not completely confirmed Isle of Capri
as the transferee of Emerald's license.35
Upon the administrative law judge's recommendation, and
the IGB's consequent decision to revoke Emerald's license, 36 both
Emerald and the Village of Rosemont filed complaints in the
bankruptcy court seeking specific performance of the plan.3 ' The
bankruptcy court rejected the proposal and the district court
Both the Village of Rosemont and
affirmed that decision. 38
Emerald then appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
II.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF
THE VILLAGE OF ROSEMONT'S APPEAL

The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Bankruptcy Code
narrowly and restrictively when it concluded that the bankruptcy
court could not enjoin the IGB from revoking Emerald's license."

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The administrative law judge's decision was based on the "findings
of fact that Emerald and its principals had dissembled about the plans to move
to Rosemont, that the renewal application Emerald had filed on September 28,
1999, was neither accurate nor complete, and that both Emerald and its
principals had not been honest in other respects." Id. The IGB accepted the
adminstrative law judge's recommendation to revoke Emerald's license and
also to deny "any efforts by Emerald to engage in gambling in Illinois at any
location." Id. (quoting administrative law judge, former U.S. Circuit Judge
Abner Mikva, in his thirty-eight page opinion recommending revocation of
Emerald's license). The IGB formally revoked Emerald's license on December
20, 2005. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 936 ("[Tlhere is no legal theory that would allow the
bankruptcy court to force the IGB and the Attorney General of Illinois to
discontinue the disciplinary proceeding against Emerald.").
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The Village of Rosemont proffered three arguments. First, it
claimed that the "First Side Letter" and the "Second Side Letter"
were parts of the reorganization plan.4' Second, the Village of
Rosemont argued that Sections 1142(b) 4' and 105(a)43 of the
Bankruptcy Code gave the bankruptcy court the power to enjoin
any activity that impeded the transfer of the license." Third, the
Village of Rosemont argued that the IGB had waived its sovereign
immunity and, therefore, was susceptible to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. 5
The Seventh Circuit held that the wording of the side letters
doomed the Village of Rosemont's first and third claims. '
Specifically, the "First Side Letter" allowed for the continuation of
the revocation proceedings if certain conditions were avoided. 7
Both sides stipulated that these conditions were not met."
Consequently, assuming that the "First Side Letter" was part of
the plan, it permitted the continuation of the revocation
proceedings.4 '9 Furthermore, the "Second Side Letter," even if
considered to be part of the bankruptcy plan, limited its reach only
to the IGB - not to the AG." Therefore, the confirmed plan did not
ban the reinstatement of the disciplinary proceedings."
As for the Village of Rosemont's third claim, the Seventh
Circuit held that the State always maintained its ability to claim
sovereign immunity from suit and in no way waived this right."
The Seventh Circuit was quick to point out that both side letters

41. Id. at 934-35.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (2006). Section 1142(b) states:

The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary party to
execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any
instrument required to effect a transfer of property dealt with by a
confirmed plan, and to perform any other act, including the satisfaction

of any lien, that is necessary for the consummation of the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1142(b).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). Section 105(a) states:

The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this
title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
44. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 935.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 936.
Id. at 934-35.
Id.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 936-37.
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specifically
reserved
the
State's
sovereign
immunity.53
Furthermore, the State was never a party to the bankruptcy
proceedings and, therefore, could not effectively waive immunity
in the bankruptcy court.54 Consequently, the Village of Rosemont's
claim that the State waived sovereign immunity was both baseless
and untenable.
As for the Village of Rosemont's second argument, the
Seventh Circuit applied an extremely limited and narrow
interpretation of the bankruptcy court's power under Sections
1142(b) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The rationale behind
the Court's holding (that these sections did not permit the
bankruptcy court to enjoin the IGB from revoking Emerald's
license) was that neither section granted a bankruptcy court
substantive rights.55 While this holding has been widely accepted
throughout other circuits," it failed to address how a bankruptcy
court's ability to enjoin the IGB from revoking Emerald's license
might equate to granting the Village of Rosemont substantive
rights.
Whether the bankruptcy court acted beyond its realm of
authority and created substantive rights, or merely equitably
protected the administration of the debtor's estate, is unclear.
Section 105(a) gives the bankruptcy court the right to "issue any
order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of the code." 7 Section 1142(b) states:
The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary party to
execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any
instrument required to effect a transfer of property dealt with by a
confirmed plan, and to perform any other act, including the
satisfaction of any lien, that is necessary for the consummation of
the plan. 5
Broadly viewed, a bankruptcy court presiding over a debtor's
estate has the power to issue any order if the subject of the order
could conceivably have an effect on the administration of the

53. Id. at 936.

54. Id. at 936-37. "[Wlhatever property right the license conferred has
always been subject to, or conditioned on, the regulatory powers of the state.
Nothing in the bankruptcy laws permits the court to enjoin the Board, a state
regulatory agency, from exercising the police powers of the state to regulate
the gambling industry." Id.
55. Id. at 935.
56. See, e.g., In re Brass Corp., 301 F.3d 296, 306 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
that Section 1142 does not confer substantive rights onto the bankruptcy
court); In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc., 124 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that Section 105(a) confers a limited power on the bankruptcy court, not full
substantive rights).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b).
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estate. In In re A. H. Robins,59 the Fourth Circuit adopted a broad
interpretation of the bankruptcy court's power under Section
105(a). The Fourth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court was
within its authority to order an injunction prohibiting suits
In so holding, the Fourth
against third-party non-debtors. 0
Circuit noted that the entire reorganization plan hinged upon the
injunctions. Therefore, the injunctions were an exercise of the
courts equitable power. 6
Likewise, the same principle has been applied in determining
when the bankruptcy court may exercise power under Section
1142(b). In In re LGI, Inc. ,6 the bankruptcy court held:
The proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or against
the debtor's property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the
outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or
freedom [of] action (either positively or negatively) and which in any
way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt
estate. 6
In the present action, the Seventh Circuit narrowly construed
the power of the bankruptcy court, holding, in this matter, that
enjoining the IGB from revoking Emerald's license would create
an independent source of rights.' The court cited a First Circuit
decision wherein the court held, "section 105(a) affords bankruptcy
courts considerably less discretion than first meets the eye, and in
no sense constitutes a roving commission to do equity."' In re
Ludlow Hospital Society, Inc., dealt with an administrator's
request to have the bankruptcy court extend a deadline for selling
a Chapter Eleven hospital's assets in order to receive a
depreciation reimbursement after the deadline had already
passed.'
The First Circuit's holding partially rested upon the
court's determination that Section 105(a) did not grant the court
the equitable power to alter a deadline imposed by a nonbankruptcy law.6' Notably, however, the First Circuit based its
holding on Section 108(b)' of the Code, as it dealt specifically with
a bankruptcy court's inability to extend a non-bankruptcy
deadline."
59.
60.
61.
62.

880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Robins].
Id. at 701.
Id.
322 B.R. 95 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005).

63. Id. at 99 (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.
1984)).
64. EmeraldIII, 482 F.3d at 935.
65. In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc., 124 F.3d at 27.

66. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 28.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2006).
69. In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc., 124 F.3d at 29. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) states,

in relevant part:
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As to the Seventh Circuit, the Village of Rosemont fell victim
to the plan that the Village of Rosemont set forth in the
bankruptcy court.
The Seventh Circuit cited an excerpt of
dialogue between the bankruptcy judge and Emerald's counsel as
evidence that all parties were aware of, and consented to, the
possibility that the IGB could change membership and revoke
Emerald's license." In acknowledging this possibility, the court
suggested that the bankruptcy court would grant the Village of
Rosemont substantive rights if it were to enjoin the IGB and the
AG from continuing the disciplinary proceeding."
The Seventh Circuit's short work of the argument, however,
leaves the reader unsatisfied. As the court held in Robins, where
the subject matter of a proposed order of the bankruptcy court
protects an element upon which the reorganization plan hinges, it
is within the province of the court to issue that order." In this
case, the reorganization plan hinged upon both: (1) Emerald
transferring its license to Isle of Capri, and (2) Isle of Capri
building a casino in Rosemont." Conceivably, per the reasoning of
Robins, it would be within the equitable powers of the bankruptcy
court to issue an order enjoining the IGB from revoking Emerald's
license, as the entire reorganization plan hinged upon this
occurrence.
Thus, while the power to remove the IGB's adjudicative
ability does seem substantive in nature, the Seventh Circuit did
very little to clarify the way in which enjoining the board from
proceeding was different from an injunction preventing civil suits.
The court confirmed the established principle that, postconfirmation, a bankruptcy court has equitable powers, but not
substantive powers."
Other circuits, however, permit a
bankruptcy court to intervene
in third-party suits when there is a

Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if applicable
nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or
an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual
protected under section 1201 or 1301 of this title may file any pleading,
demand, notice, or proof of claim or loss, cure a default, or perform any
other similar act, and such period has not expired before the date of the
filing of the petition, the trustee may only file, cure, or perform, as the
case may be, before the later of - -

(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
11 U.S.C. § 108(b).
70. See supra notes 30-31 (citing the conversation between the bankruptcy
judge and Emerald's counsel).
71. Emerald 11!, 482 F.3d at 936.
72. Robins, 880 F.2d at 701.
73. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 931.
74. Id. at 935.
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5
nexus between the suits and the administration of the estate.
One can interpret the Seventh Circuit's broad holding as requiring
bankruptcy courts to refrain from intervening in state
This is so even when the
administrative proceedings.
administrative proceeding has the grave potential to affect the
interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or
administration of a confirmed plan.

III.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF
EMERALD CASINO'S APPEAL

The Seventh Circuit ruled against Emerald on appeal and in
doing so set the precedent that under Section 362(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code,76 a bankruptcy court cannot stay a state
administrative proceeding.77 In its appeal, Emerald argued that
the district court erred in denying an automatic stay of the IGB's
disciplinary decision."
In support of its position, the Seventh
Circuit cited Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which,
according to the court, "forb[ade] the bankruptcy court from
interfering with the government's police and regulatory powers." 9
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code was
enacted to protect a debtor's ability to assess its financial situation
without interference from interested creditors."0 An exception to

75. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("In bankruptcy cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a
third party, provided the injunction plays an important part in the debtor's
reorganization plan.") (internal citation omitted); see also In re Davis, 730 F.2d
176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that bankruptcy courts have the "authority to
enjoin litigants from pursuing actions pending in other courts that threaten
the integrity of a bankrupt's estate") (internal citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Diners Club, Inc. v. Bumb, 421 F.2d 396, 398 (9th
Cir. 1970).
In the exercise of its jurisdiction over the debtor's property, the
[bankruptcy] court had power to issue injunctions and all other writs
necessary to protect the estate from interference, and to ensure its
orderly administration.... [The bankruptcy court's power] extends to
the stay of proceedings in other courts, whenever such stays are
necessary to conserve the assets of the estate, or to prevent interference
with the orderly rehabilitation of the debtor corporation.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2006).
77. EmeraldIII, 482 F.3d at 938.
78. Id. at 937.
79. Id. at 938.
80. See Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdictionand Agency
Action: Resolving the Next Wave of Conflict, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 948 (2001)
(interpreting House Bill 95-595 as it relates to automatic stays in bankruptcy
proceedings). The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977). It gives
the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. Id. It stops all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. Id. It permits the debtor
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the automatic stay provision exists when a governmental
1
authority attempts to exercise its regulatory authority."
The
Seventh Circuit read the Bankruptcy Code as conclusively
prohibiting the bankruptcy court from affecting the State's
regulatory power." The Seventh Circuit cited Nelson v. La Crosse
County District Attorneys3 in support of this interpretation. In
Nelson, a bankruptcy court was unable to stay a criminal
proceeding against a debtor for her operation of a business that
was the subject of the bankruptcy proceeding.' The basis of the
court's finding in Nelson was that the criminal proceeding was not
part of the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction."5 The Seventh
Circuit analogized the position of the debtor in Nelson to
Emerald's position."6
Again, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Bankruptcy Code
narrowly and in a limited manner when it adjudicated this claim.
The court plainly read Section 362(b) as a complete bar against a
bankruptcy court staying a state regulatory proceeding."' The
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and the decisions in
multiple circuits, however, permit the exercise of discretion by the
bankruptcy judge depending upon the purpose of the regulatory
agency. For instance, in In re Shippers Interstate Service, Inc.,88
the Seventh Circuit held that when a governmental regulatory
proceeding has the grave potential to affect the assets of an estate,
the court may use "discretion."' Likewise, the Eight Circuit in In
re State of Missouri' held, "the term 'police or regulatory power'
refers to the enforcement of state laws affecting health, welfare,
morals, and safety, but not regulatory laws that directly conflict
with the control of the res or property by the bankruptcy court." 1
to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the
financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. Id.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). Section 362(b)(4) states:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title or of
an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970, does not operate as a stay (4) ... of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding
by a governmental unit... to enforce such governmental unit's or
organization's police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of
a judgment other than a money judgment ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(b).
82. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 938.
83. 301 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2002).
84. Id. at 823-25.
85. Id. at 838.
86. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 938.
87. Id.
88. 618 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 11.
90. 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 776.
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Additionally, in drafting Section 362, many politicians opposed the
idea that the 362(b) exception from the automatic stay for
regulatory agencies would act as an "automatic" exception.92
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit never discussed whether
the IGB acted in an effort to protect the health, welfare, morals, or
safety of the state, thereby exercising its regulatory powers; or
whether the IGB acted more for a pecuniary interest. If the
Seventh Circuit were to have undertaken this task it is quite
possible that the Seventh Circuit would have viewed the IGB's
actions as pecuniary in nature.
First, the Illinois General
Assembly announced its intent for the licensing program to
increase state revenues via the IRGA amendment of May 3, 2003."3
Essentially, the state legislature announced that increased
commercial activity was the focus of the IGB.
Moreover,
considering the financial interests that were at stake in this claim,
the potential for the interference of a pecuniary interest was
great.94 Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's holding, simply being a
state regulatory agency should not alone suffice to grant blanket
authority to interfere with a Chapter Eleven estate.
IV. CONCLUSION

The hand that the Seventh Circuit dealt in its holding is
ominous at best.
The Seventh Circuit's narrow and plain
interpretation of the implicated bankruptcy law provisions set a
dangerous precedent for casino administrators and financiers
operating within the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction. The lesson
casino administrators and financiers should take from this holding
is to be wary of the manner in which they construct bankruptcy
plans. The gaming licenses casinos hold should no longer be
considered playing chips on the table during plan construction. At
a moment's notice, the IGB has vested regulatory authority to
remove these chips even when, as in Emerald's case, the gaming
license was the only chip on the table.

92. While the exception should be construed in such a way that the
government body may pursue legitimate police power/regulatory goals, it
should not apply so as to except agency action whose aim is to "protect a
pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property of the estate." 124
CONG. REC. H32, 395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); accord 124 CONG.
REC. S33, 995 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
93. Emerald III, 482 F.3d at 930. Additionally, the amendment permitted
the IGB to reissue a license that had been revoked or not renewed, and also
provided that if a casino operator's license was revoked or expired without
renewal, the proceeds from re-issuance of the license would go directly to the

state. Id.
94. See Hinz, supra note 5 (discussing the financial interests at stake in the
Emerald Casino relocation).

